Social Security and Public Welfare by Teple, Edwin R.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 3
1957
Social Security and Public Welfare
Edwin R. Teple
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Edwin R. Teple, Social Security and Public Welfare, 8 W. Res. L. Rev. 360 (1957)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol8/iss3/29
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
made, for five years, become the property of the person to whom loaned
unless reservation of a right to them is made to the lender in writing and
recorded in the office of the county recorder or unless recorded as chattel
mortgages or conditional sales.
Plaintiff sold nuts through vending machines which it leased to cus-
tomers under written leases good for five years, and thereafter from year
to year until lessee should give lessor 30 days written notice or lessor
should give lessee six months notice of intention to terminate.
In an action by plaintiff lessor in replevin against a person who suc-
ceeded to the interest of plaintiff's original lessee of the machine and
who refused to return it to lessor on demand, the court held that there
was no "pretended loan," no fraud and no loss of tide 'by plaintiff. Sec-
tion 1335.03 did not apply to the transaction and did not require as
between the parties that it be in writing or be recorded.
SAMUEL SONENFIELD
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
Unemployment Insurance
Two of the cases reported during the past year involved the question
of burden of proof in connection with unemployment benefit claims.
In Orr v. Bureau of Unemployment Corn pensatzon, the record before
the court contained no evidence respecting the claimant's availability for
work aside from the daimant's own testimony that she had been seeking
employment, as required by the express provision of the statute. The
court held that in such circumstances the claim should have been allowed.
The referee had partially disallowed the daim after benefits had been
awarded by the administrator, on some basis not dear from the record
itself, and the court ruled that this decision was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
Conversely, it was held in Minnich v. State2 that the clamant's bur-
den of proof had not been sustained where, on the basis of the evidence,
he had failed to establish that occasional long hours which he was re-
quired to work as a poultry dresser constituted "just cause" for leaving his
employment. The claimant testified that he had been required to work
from 80 to 90 hours a week at the rate of $1.00 an hour, and there was
definite evidence that his hands were cracked and scaled. The employer's
records showed that he had worked 84 hours in at least one week, but
1 138 N.E.2d 678 (Ohio C.P 1954)
2138 N.E.2d 34 (Ohio C.P 1956)
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according to the employer, his average was only 54 hours per week over
the year. The claimant admitted that he had agreed to work overtime for
the holiday season, and had not complained to the employer. The em-
ployer also testified that the hours worked were not unusual for this in-
dustry. The claimant said that he got tired but had not consulted a doctor
about his conditon.
The court expressed the opimon that occasional long working hours
do not per se constitute "just cause" for quitting and overruled both the
agency and the referee, by whom benefits had been allowed, holding that
they should have been demed.
From the opimon itself, it is difficult to determine just what would
justify quitting. In at least one earlier case it was held that overtime
hours did justify voluntary leaving, where a woman testified that the over-
time she was compelled to work was detrimental to her health, and no
other evidence was presented.3 Moreover, dissatisfaction with working
conditAons has been held to be just cause for quitting, even though the
employee had endured the conditions complained of for approximately
two years.4 It seems fairly apparent that the view in these cases does not
jibe with the conclusion in the instant case, notwithstanding certain dis-
tingishing factors.
The claimant in the Minnich case was admittedly required to work
substantially in excess of 40 hours a week with no provision for overtime
pay. Although it is unlikely that the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act
applied in this instance, the worker's decision to quit, particularly in view
of the condition of his hands as shown by the record, would seem to be
not entirely without justification. To say, under such circumstances, that
the claimant has failed to meet the burden of proof required under the
Unemployment Compensation Act is open to question. It is doubtful
that the Act was intended to impose this strict a burden in view of the
fact that few claimants can afford to retain counsel, and many of them are
unfamiliar with the provisions of the law or the manner of proving their
dam. The second ground for the court's decision appears more tenable.5
In Moore v. Board of ReVew, 6 the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that
3 Hoffer v. State, CCH U.I. SERV. (Ohio) 5 8454 (Licking C.P. 1954), referred to in
1954 Survey, 6 WEST. RES. L. REV. 291, 296 (1955). In this case, the court re-
versed a decision by the agency denying benefits.
'Redmond v. Harwood Screw Products, Inc., CCH U.I. SERv. (Ohio) 5 8453 (Clark
C.P. 1954), referred to in 1954 Survey, 6 WEST. REs. L. REv. 291, 296 (1955).
The claimant, in his original application, had reported that he was laid off due to
lack of work, which was not actually the case. The court ruled that this was an
additional ground for denying the claim since giving this erroneous information
constituted a false statement of a material fact which required disqualification under
a different section of the law.
0165 Ohio St. 526, 138 N.E.2d 245 (1956).
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payments of monthly installments of an annuity under the United States
Civil Service Retirement Act were not sufficiently similar to payments
under the Old Age and Survivors Insurance program to require charging
against unemployment benefits pursuant to the terms of Revised Code
Section 4141.31 (A) (3) As a result, the recipient of the Civil Service
annuity payments was not precluded from receiving unemployment in-
surance benefits by reason of the fact that the former exceeded the latter.7
The Ohio race tracks made an effort during the past year to have their
business declared seasonal so as to avoid being charged with unemploy-
ment occurring during periods when the tracks were not in operation.
The application for such a determination was denied by the administra-
tor, however, and this decision was upheld by the common pleas court on
appeal8
Under section 4141.33 of the Revised Code, an industry is to be con-
sidered seasonal if it is customary to operate, because of climatic condi-
tions or because of the seasonal nature thereof, only during regularly re-
curring periods of less than 36 weeks duration. If such a determination
is made, benefits are payable to workers engaged in such seasonal em-
ployment only during the longest seasonal periods which the practice of
such industry will reasonably permit.
In the instant case, it was found that the majority of the tracks in
Ohio retain many of their employees during a period of from 9 to 11
months, in excess of the period referred to in the statute. The court also
pointed out that the periods during which the tracks operate are not based
on weather or nature's vagaries, but are limited by statute enacted by the
state legislature. Consequently, this is not one of the industries or em-
ployments contemplated by the seasonal provisions of the Unemployment
Compensation Act.9
Two cases previously referred to in connection with the application
7The decision was not unanimous, three of the judges (Taft, Weygandt and Stewart)
being of the opinion that these were similar payments within the meaning of the Ohio
law. The majority, however, relied upon such differences as the higher rate for
Civil Service Retirement (6%), the available options ?or settlement, and the fact
that the employee's contributions may be recovered with interest under certain cir-
cumstances. In other respects, of course, similarities do exist, the difference between
the F.I.C.A. tax and the deductions imposed under the Federal Retirement System
being fairly superficial. The Federal Retirement System has been amended in re-
cent years and the benefit provisions are quite similar as the two laws are now written.
"Social Security" is social insurance and not a poor man s pension as the court of
appeals had seemed to imply.
8Application of Race Tracks of Ohio, 137 N.E.2d 211 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
'The only major industry to qualify thus far has been shipping on the Great Lakes.
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